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ABSTRACT
The Dollarization Process in Mexico: 1983-1997
by
Luis J. Del Rivero
Dr. Ron M. Cronovich, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Economics 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The purpose of this study is to analyze the extent of dollarization in the Mexican 
economy during the period 1983-1997. Dollarization is defined as the replacement of 
domestic currency for dollars as a store of value or for transaction purposes. In this study, 
a narrow definition of dollarization will be used as an estimate of the amount of dollars 
circulating in the Mexican economy. This measure includes only the dollar-denominated 
demand deposits held by businesses in Mexican banks, since the public is no longer 
allowed to hold this type of accounts and a better measure for the exact amount of dollars 
circulating in the Mexican economy is not available. This study will enqihasize the effects 
of expected peso depreciations, peso devaluations, and political changes on the 
dollarization process.
m
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Dollarization refers to using dollars instead of domestic currency as a unit of 
account, store of value, or medium of exchange. High inflation and frequent currency 
devaluations are factors that diminish the confidence in the domestic currency, creating an 
incentive for money-holders to maintain their money balances in the currency that 
depreciates least rapidly. When the confidence in the domestic money declines, money 
deman ders will tend to substitute away from domestic money in favor of more stable 
foreign money. Because the U.S. dollar is a more stable currency compared to most 
domestic currencies of Less Developed Countries (LDCs), it serves as an important 
substitute for those domestic currencies.
The dollarization process usually evolves in a predictable manner. As domestic 
inflation increases, domestic residents turn to foreign money as a store of value to avoid 
the rapid depreciation of the domestic currency. As high inflation continues, the next 
stage of the dollarization process involves using dollars as a unit of account. Some prices 
of “big-ticket” items begin to be quoted in foreign currency. Shortly after, some 
transactions are performed in dollars, especially those involving large transfers of funds. 
Whether or not dollars are ever used as more than a store of value depends on the
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
government’s ability to implement credible macroeconomic policy reforms.
A brief analysis of the economic conditions of Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru in the last 
two decades exemplifies the dollarization process. A feature common to these countries is 
that the public was allowed to maintain Foreign Currency Deposits (FCDs) in their 
domestic financial system. The FCDs (demand deposits of foreign currency, usually 
dollars, held by the public in domestic banks) were allowed with the objective o f inducing 
the return of capital that had previously left the country due to economic instability. This 
measure was either accompanied or preceded by a large devaluation and it was intended to 
restore macroeconomic equilibrhun. In particular, Bolivia eliminated all restrictions on 
holding FCDs in October 1973, a few months after its fixed peg system was interrupted by 
a 68 percent devaluation; likewise, Mexico eliminated the restrictions in March of 1977, 
following a 37 percent devaluation in September of 1976; Peru followed in 1978, after the 
sol was left to float and depreciated by more than 60 percent.
The financial reform that promoted the use of FCDs ended abruptly in the early 
1980s. In all three cases the respective authorities converted the FCDs held by the private 
sector into domestic money, fhis measure was originated when the dollars reserves held 
by the three countries started to approach a low critical level. The amounts of dollar 
reserves held were close to the point where they would not be able to cover all of the 
FCDs if the investors wanted to convert them into real dollars. As a consequence, the 
corresponding central banks converted all dollar-denominated debts into the domestic 
currency at a rate well below the market rate. This occurred in Mexico in August 1982, in 
Bolivia in October 1982, and in Peru in July of 1985. The reimposition of controls on the 
FCDs was accompanied by a large devaluation and the reinstitution of a fixed exchange
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rate in all three cases. In Mexico, this measure was one of the last taken by President 
Lopez Portillo, while in Peru it was one measure taken by President Garcia during his first 
address to Congress. Before 1982, during most of the ten years of reform in Bolivia, the 
ratio o f FCDs to M2 was less than 20 percent, reaching 40 percent in October 1982. In 
comparison, the ratio of FCDs to M2 in Mexico was less than 5 percent until 1977, and 
reached 36 percent in June 1982. In contrast, the ratio in Peru grew steadily since 1978 
reaching 50 percent by mid-1982 and more than 100 percent by December 1984.
The dollarization process has persisted in the Latin American countries despite 
wide fluctuations in inflation. According to Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), when 
inflation increases, dollarization also increases, but when inflation starts to decrease, 
dollarization tends to remain constant unless the appropriate credible economic policies 
are established. In Bolivia, dollarization was relatively low between 1982 and 1985, at a 
time when a stabilization plan was established to fight hyperinflation. Between 1985 and 
1987, following the abandonment of the stabilization plan, inflation was high and 
dollarization increased by 50 percent. But Wien inflation dropped to about 3-4 percent a 
quarter in the mid-1990s, dollarization continued. Conversely, dollarization and inflation 
in Mexico were both relatively stable in the early 1970s; however, inflation increased in 
1976-77 after the 1976 devaluation while the process of dollarization accelerated. But 
when inflation fell back, the level of dollarization did not follow. It remained stable until 
1981, when inflation and dollarization rose again. In Peru, even though inflation 
fluctuated widely, dollarization continued to increase fi'om less than 5 percent in 1978 to 
over 50 percent by the end of 1984.
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In this study, the focus will be on the dollarization process in the Mexican 
economy in the period after the forced de-dollarization of 1982. The impact of inflation, 
currency devaluation, and political instability on the degree of dollarization will be 
analyzed. Following previous studies, a narrow definition of dollarization will be used that 
includes the dollar-denominated demand deposits held by businesses only, since the public 
is no longer allowed to hold this type of accounts and no other measure exist of the 
amount of dollars circulating in the economy.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
historical perspective of the Mexican economy. Chapter 3 contains a review of the 
literature. Chapter 4 provides the empirical model and the data used. Chapter 5 provides 
the empirical results, and the final chapter provides concluding remarks and policy 
recommendations.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER!
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Throughout the twentieth century the Mexican economy has been subject to many 
economic transformations. Economic events ranging from stagnation, triple-digit 
inflation, double-digit unemployment, frequent devaluations, and foreign capital flights, to 
steady growth, single-digit inflation and single-digit unemployment, currency 
appreciations, and capital accumulation, have all occurred in Mexico, sometimes even in 
the same year. This chapter presents a brief historical review of the economic events of 
the last few decades and their association with the process of dollarization.
Foreign currency deposits have coexisted with peso deposits in Mexico even 
before the creation of the Banco de Mexico in 1925. The ratio of dollar to peso demand 
deposits fell consistently during the first fixed exchange rate period from 1933 to 1938.
At the end of 1937. less than 6 percent of the checking deposits were in dollars. In March 
of 1938. President Lazaro Cardenas nationalized the oü industry and allowed the peso to 
float. The dollar to peso deposit ratio reached over 15 percent in 1940 and it did not 
decline until 1944 when it reached 6 percent following the establishment of the fixed 
exchange rate. Inflation averaged over 10 percent between 1940 and 1954 (the ‘take-off” 
period), entailing a more than doubling of the peso-dollar exchange rate, affected by two
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devaluations in 1948 and 1954. During this period, the dollarization ratio increased from 
7.5 to 11.5 percent. The exchange rate of 8.65 pesos per dollar lasted until 1954 when the 
peso was devaluated again 45 percent.
From 1954 to 1970 (the “stabilizing growth” period), the Mexican economy was 
characterized by the highest rate o f output growth and lowest rate of inflation in Mexican 
history. The exchange rate remained unchanged at 12.5 pesos per dollar throughout this 
period. Domestic capital formation was favored by direct government involvement in 
major industries, as well as fiscal incentives for both domestic and foreign private 
investment. During this period, after the devaluation of 1954, the dollarization ratio 
increased and stabilized aroimd 20 to 25 percent in 1956. It increased again in 1957 
reaching 30 percent at the end of 1958. The ratio declined in 1959 all throughout the 
sixties and early seventies. In 1973 inflation accelerated , the external deficit increased, 
and by the end of the Echeverria presidency in 1976 the exchange rate had to be 
devaluated. Once more the dollarization ratio increased.
Throughout the Presidencies of Lopez Portillo and De La Madrid Hurtado, 1977- 
1988 (the ‘Tragic Dozen” period), the government embarked on a policy of aggressive 
deficit spending and monetary expansion. Accelerating inflation and a fixed nominal 
exchange rate entailed a rapid real appreciation of the peso. As oil prices weakened, 
foreign hank lending to Mexico shrank rapidly and private capital flight increased in 
anticipation of another devaluation. As a result, the process of dollarization accelerated. 
From 1977 to 1981, the ratio of dollars to pesos in Mexican banks fluctuated between 25 
and 35 percent. It remained stable until 1981 when inflation and dollarization climbed 
again. In 1982 it reached a peak of 58 percent followed by a precipitous drop at the end
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of the year. This drop was mainly due to the forced de-dollarization policy.
In August 1982, Mexico froze dollar-denominated deposits in Mexican banks and 
required that they be converted into Mexican pesos at a controlled exchange rate (70 to 
the dollar, well below the market rate). These government restrictions increased the costs 
of transacting in dollars Wiich caused a higher demand for domestic money than otherwise 
would exist. Nevertheless, the government was not able to effectively prohibit domestic 
citizen’s use of dollars. Dollars have continued to circulate, even if only clandestinely.
Dollar-denominated deposits were allowed in Mexico once again after the period 
of forced de-dollarization, but only in special cases like for example large exports and 
imports business who needed to deal in dollars. Besides these special cases, private 
individuals were not allowed to have dollar-denominated deposits.
At the end of 1982, the annual inflation rate approached 100 percent accompanied 
by large fiscal and trade deficits and high interest rates in international markets. With the 
establishment of several stabilization programs, inflation was reduced to about 60 percent 
in 1984 (see Figure 1). However, international oü prices dropped dramatically in late 
1985, rapidly increasing peso prices of imports and depressing real incomes. This led to 
accelerating inflation above 100 percent (160 percent in 1987), and negative real deposit 
rates. When the U.S. and Mexican stock market crashed in October 1987, the Mexican 
currency suffered again, a devaluation and a massive outflow of capital were the 
consequences. Starting in 1988, a crawling peg was implemented with a preaimounced 
rate of peso depreciation. Inflation fell from three-digit levels in 1988 to about 7 percent 
in 1994. It was accompanied by large capital inflows from 1990 to 1994, and by a 
significant appreciation of the real exchange rate (see Figure 2).
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Figure I. Inflation Differentials Between Mexico and the U.S.
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Figure 2. Real Exchange Rate (Pesos per Dollar).
In December 20, 1994, large current account deficits, real appreciation of the peso, 
and political instability forced the government to devaluate the peso 15 percent. Two days 
later the peso was allowed to float fi-eely, falling 30 percent more. Although, data on the 
amount of dollars circulating in the Mexican economy during these later periods of
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economic instability is not available, one can assume that the ratio of dollars to pesos in 
the economy increased after the peso crisis. Figure 3 shows the changes in the ratio of 
dollar-denominated to peso-denominated demand deposits as an estimate for the true 
dollarization ratio.
Tlie previous historical review shows an interesting coincidence. The different 
dates in which large increases in dollarization were experienced, 1940, 1952, 1958, 1976, 
1982. and 1994 correspond also to the last year of a presidential administration, while 
peso devaluations also occurred in 1954, 1976, 1982, 1987, and 1994. It seems that 
besides inflation, both devaluation expectations and perceptions of possible political 
instability associated with the replacement of the administration are important factors in 
explaining the historical development of the Mexican dollarization process.
DOLLARIZATION RATIO ( 1983-1997)
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CHAPTERS 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The phenomenon of dollarization has been extensively analyzed in the literature. A 
common characteristic of previous studies is the use of the ratio of dollar-denominated to 
peso- denominated currency deposits in peso terms as an estimate of the degree of 
dollarization during the years when these deposits were allowed. Some of these studies 
include Clements and Schwartz ( 1993), Rojas-Suarez ( 1992), Rogers ( 1992), Ortiz 
( 1983). and Savastano ( 1992).
Savastano ( 1992), provided an overview of the main features of the 'dollarization ' 
process experienced by Bolivia, Mexico, Pern, and Uruguay in the past two decades. He 
concluded that the creation of Foreign Currency Deposits (PCD) with the objective of 
improving the external position of the central bank or encouraging financial intermediation 
tends to increase the flight of domestic money which eventually reduces the residents’ 
holdings of domestic money balances making more difficult the conduct of monetary 
policies. Furthermore, Sahay and Vegh (1995), showed that fighting dollarization with 
artificial measures, such as forcing the conversion of foreign assets into domestic assets, 
merely contributes to magnifying the eventual inflationary explosion. Dollarization is one 
of the consequences and not the cause of existing fiscal and monetary disequilibria that are
10
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Il
manifested in chronic fiscal deficits and accommodative monetary and exchange rate 
policy.
Additionally, studies by Ramirez-Rojas ( 1985) and Ortiz ( 1983 ) concluded that 
the ratio of MexdoUars (dollar-denominated demand deposits) to pesos demand deposits 
increases as depreciation expectations begin to aggravate. In contrast, Rogers ( 1992) 
estimated the demand for U.S. dollars relative to domestic currency in both Mexico and 
Canada. He found that in the Mexican case a negative and significant correlation exist 
between the ratio of Mexdollars to pesos-denominated demand deposits, as a restrictive 
measure of the degree of dollarization, and the expected rate of depreciation of the peso. 
This correlation is explained by the investors’ understanding that when dollar reserves 
approach a low critical level the government expects the investors to withdraw fi’om their 
Mexdollar accounts, so it reacts by converting Mexdollars into pesos. The investors then 
precipitate a run on Mexdollars as central bank reserves run low. Because this process 
corresponds to periods in which the peso is expected to devaluate, higher expected 
depreciation is associated with a lower relative demand for Mexdollars. These conflicting 
results might be explained by lookmg at the time period in which the studies were 
conducted. Ramirez-Rojas ( 1985) and Ortiz ( 1983) used samples that included data 
previous to the forced de-dollarization of 1982 when money holders did not expect the de- 
dollarization pohcy to ever happen. In contrast, Rogers (1992) included data of several 
years after the forced de-dollarization, when money holders were already aware that the 
de-dollarization policy could happen again if the government considered to be appropriate 
and inflation was high enough.
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Using a different approach, Melvin and Ladman (1991) investigated whether 
dollarization o f  some Latin American coimtries can be attributed to the illicit drug trade 
where business is conducted using dollars. Using the data on informal loans of the 
Cochabamba Upper Valley in Bolivia, they found that the effects of the term and size of 
loans is consistent with the financial needs o f the drug industry which is highly dollarized. 
This demonstrates that the seasonality of the coca harvest and the production of coca 
paste is likely to be an important determinant of the availability of dollars to loan in 
important coca-producing valleys of Bolivia.
Guidotti and Rodriguez ( 1992) stated that an economy may become more 
dollarized over time in response to a high inflation level, rather than just in response to 
increasing inflation. Likewise, Clements and Schwartz (1993) foimd that in Bolivia, 
dollarization is Ukely to persist even if substantial policy efforts are made to reduce 
inflation or increase interest rates. This occurs because of inertia factors which suggest an 
asymmetry where dollarization increases rapidly with macroeconomic instability, but is 
difficult to reverse even after years of macroeconomic stability. Transactions costs are 
incurred by economic agents when they substitute one currency for another. Because of 
these transactions costs, dollarization may not be reduced after inflation rates fall fi-om a 
period of high inflation.
In addition, Melvin and Peiers (1996) analyzed the costs o f large seigniorage losses 
facing domestic governments. They concluded that high transaction costs of switching 
monies, dollar revenues related to illegal co mmercial activities, and network externalities 
associated with foreign currency usage are the explanations for the observed inertia in de- 
dollarization following domestic stabilization policies.
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Regarding the effects of expectations and credibility on the process of 
dollarization, Rojas-Suarez ( 1992) found that for the case of Peru, it is appropriate to 
consider if the existence of dollarization may constitute “good news” for governments 
dealing with inflation by reducing the fiscal deficit and the expansion of domestic money 
supply. This would depend on the credibility of the announced economic program and on 
the perception of economic agents regarding the durability of the adjustment efforts. If 
the deceleration of money growth is perceived as permanent, an increase over time of the 
relative holding of domestic money is expected. In contrast, lack of credibility may 
account for the persistence of the dollarization process. Likewise, Bien ( 1990) concluded 
that confidence in the national currency is an important factor when dealing with 
dollarization. If little Fahh exists in the national currency, foreign currencies become an 
object of intensified stocking up, not only as a result of high inflation but also because the 
person saving such currency is in a much better position than one who holds that national 
currency.
Fasano (1986), cites relatively higher inflation rates and foreign exchange risk 
effects as causes for holding dollars instead of the domestic currency. Exchange risk 
increases when the exchange rate is floating. In the Mexican case, the relatively short 
periods o f floating exchange rate and the constant intervention of the Banco de Mexico 
have prevented the dollarization process fi'om increasing to even higher levels compared 
to other Latin American countries. Still, the process of dollarization continues to occur to 
a certain level.
Finally, Calvo and Vegh ( 1992), concluded that regarding dollarization there are 
no simple policy prescriptions. On the one hand, motivating the use of the domestic
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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currency gives the government extra leeway to collect taxes and to react to exogenous 
shocks. This extra freedom creates excess reliance on inflation tax. On the other hand, 
measures against the use of domestic currency, like fiill dollarization , may at least provide 
temporary relief against inflation. However, full dollarization without a lender of last 
resort may make the domestic hanking system fragile to capital flight and may lead to 
possibly deep financial crisis.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
In theory, high inflation, frequent currency devaluations, and the perceptions of 
“political risk” (uncertainty associated with political regime changes), are expected to 
diminished the confidence on the domestic currency and create incentives for money 
holders to substitute domestic currency for more stable foreign currency. The effect of 
these variables is measured empirically in this chapter. The following reduced-form model 
is based on a simple structural model proposed by Ortiz ( 1983) and Clements and 
Schwartz (1993).' It was estimated by ordinary least squares using quarterly data from 
1983:1 to 1997:4.
M R R = f (TREND, VALUE-i, VALUE-2, INFR-i, INFR-2, INFR-j, PRES, MRR-jM R R -2)
where the dependent and independent variables are defined as follows:
MRR: Is the dollarization ratio, measured as the ratio of the portion dollar-denominated
'The model in this study was calculated in linear form instead of semi-log form as 
in Ortiz (1983). Based on Davidson R  and J. MacKhmon (1981) a test was performed 
concluding that the linear form was more appropriate for this regression.
15
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demand deposits to the peso-denominated demand deposits.*  ̂ One-period and 
two-period lags of this variable are also considered to account for the dynamic 
effects of the independent variables on the dollarization ratio.
TREND: Is a linear time trend.
VALUE: Represents an estimation for the expected value of the peso with respect to the 
dollar (overvalued or undervalued), measured by the deviations of the real 
exchange rate from trend.'* If the change in value is perceived as temporary, this 
variable is expected to have a negative effect on the level of dollarization. As the 
real exchange rate rise above its trend, the peso becomes temporarily undervalued, 
so that it becomes more attractive to hold pesos instead of dollars. This variable 
was obtained by using the residuals of the following equation:
REXR=Bo + BiTREND + E
where REXR is equal to the real exchange rate obtained by the ratio of the United 
States consumer price level to the Mexican consumer price levef^ times the
"Since the public is no longer allowed to have dollar-denominated accounts and an 
effective measure of the amount of dollars circulating in the Mexican economy does not 
exist, the dollar-denominated demand deposits includes mainly dollar-denominated 
accounts held by businesses, used only for businesses purposes and not for private use. As 
a result, this variable tends to underestimate the actual extent of dollarization. However, 
the fluctuations of this variable should approximate the fluctuations of the real 
dollarization ratio.
^Other studies have used the money demand as the dependent variable when 
dealing with currency substitution; however, when dealing with dollarization, the ratio of 
MRR is a more appropriate variable.
*Ortiz ( 1983) used this variable as a proxy for foreign exchange risk.
*For estimation purposes, CPI and the inflation rate are used for both Mexico and 
the U.S. with 1994 as a base year.
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nominal exchange rate of pesos per dollar. TREND is the time trend and E is the 
residual.'* After some experimentation, a two-period lag structure was found to 
perform adequately.
INFR; Is the expected depreciation of the exchange rate, measured by the differential 
between the Mexican inflation rate and the United States inflation rate.^ * The 
effect of this variable on MRR is ambiguous. As the inflation differential increases 
between Mexico and the United States, the peso is expected to depreciate more, 
causing money holders to increase their holdings of dollars. However, when the 
depreciation of the domestic currency is expected to increase, money holders may 
withdraw from their dollar denominated accounts, because of the fear that dollar 
reserves held by the central hank will drop forcing the domestic government to 
convert the dollar-denominated accounts to domestic currency at a below market 
rate. A three-term lag structure o f this variable was found to perform adequately.
PRES: Is a binary dummy variable that accounts for the “political risk” factor already 
mentioned. It takes the value of 1 for each of the four quarters before and the 
four quarters after a Presidential election and a 0 for all other quarters. This
"The results from this regression are: REXR=5.0366 - 0.0213TREND; 
R-squared=0.2188, standard errors in parenthesis. (0.1861)*** (0.0053)***
Ideally, the measure of expected nominal depreciation would be the difference 
between the spot and the forward exchange rates. However, this measure was not used 
for the period analyzed in this study because since 1985, Mexico n longer has a forward 
exchange rate. This proxy was also used by Ramirez-Rojas ( 1985), Ortiz ( 1983), and 
Guidotti and Rodriguez ( 1992).
®The changes in the CPI, are used to measure the rate of inflation for both Mexico 
and the U.S.
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variable was chosen because Mexican economic history has shown that economic 
changes including devaluations are more likely to occur in the year after and in the 
year before a new President is elected. Hence, PRES is expected to have a 
positive eftect on the level of dollarization. Uncertainty regarding the 
political and economic policies of the new administration increase the risk of 
holding domestic currency.
The data on Mexico (CPI, exchange rate, demand-deposhs in dollars and pesos, 
and the price level) were obtained from the Banco de Mexico, Indicadores Economicos, 
1997, and the data on the United States (CPI and the price level) were obtained from 
various issues of International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
Table 1 provides a brief description of the variables, the e?q)ected signs, and the 
summary statistics. Between 1983 and 1997, the ratio of dollar-denominated demand 
deposits to peso-denominated demand deposits (MRR) averaged 9.9%. The average 
deviation of the real exchange rate from trend (VALUE) in Mexico is close to zero pesos 
per dollar, and the average inflation differential between Mexico and the U.S. (INFR) is 
47.13%.
Table 2 shows the correlation between the variables. In brief the dollarization 
ratio MRR tends to increase when the real exchange rate of the peso is temporarily 
undervalued (an increase in VALUE). Also, the dollarization ratio tends to decrease when 
the peso is expected to depreciate (an increase in INFR). Finally, if the quarter in mention 
is one of the four quarters before or after a Presidential election (PRES) the dollarization 
ratio tends to increase.
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Table 1. Variables Description, Expected Signs, and Descriptive Statistics
Variables (expected signs) Definition Mean
(standard deviation)
Dependent Variable 
MRR
Ratio of dollar-denominated 
to peso-denominated deposits. 
A one and two lag terms of 
this variable are also included 
as independent variables.
0.099013
(0.05341)
Independent Variables 
TREND (?) Time trend. 30.50000
(17.46425)
VALUE (?) Deviation of real exchange 
rate firom trend. A one and 
two-lag terms of this variable 
are also included.
0.000000
(0.706023)
INFR(?) Inflation differential between 
Mexico and the U.S. A one 
through four lag terms of this 
variable are also included.
47.137000
(42.78300)
PRES(^) = 1 for the 4 quarters before 
and after a Presidential 
election.
0.333333
(0.475383)
REXR Real exchange rate, pesos per 
dollar.
4.38588
(0.798327)
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix
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Variable MRR TREND VALUE V.4LUE-I VALUE-2 INFR INFR-i
MRR 1.0000
TREND 0.9480 1.0000
V.AJ,LJE 0.1131 -0.0184 1.0000
VALUE-i 0.1301 -0.0165 0.8924 1.0000
V.ALUE-2 0.1464 -0.0143 0.7545 0.8924 1.0000
INFR -0.4543 -0.5815 0.5438 0.6425 0.6854 1.0000
[N FR-i -0.4506 -0.5883 0.4269 0.5394 0.6382 0.9533 1.0000
INFR-2 -0.4604 -0.6007 0.3142 0.4194 0.5316 0.8450 0.9532
INFR-3 -0.4899 -0.6173 0.2033 0.3049 0.4098 0.7071 0.8456
INFR-» -0.5248 -0.6310 0.1102 0.1972 0.2986 0.5687 0.7107
PRES 0.2574 0.1565 0.0782 0.0312 0.0187 0.0002 0.0668
MRR-i 0.9860 0.9551 0.0705 0.1148 0.1304 -0.4791 -0.4624
MRR-2 0.9657 0.9625 0.0247 0.0730 0.1155 -0.5159 -0.4867
Table 2. Continuation.
Variable INFR-2 INFR-3 INFR-J PRES MRR-1 MRR-2
INFR-2 1.0000
INFR-3 0.9539 1.0000
1NFR-» 0.8491 0.9552 1.0000
PRES 0.1247 0.1755 0.2228 1.0000
MRR-1 -0.4647 -0.4788 -0.5051 0.2209 1.0000
MRR-2 -0.4759 -0.4824 -0.4939 0.1737 0.9864 1.0000
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CHAPTERS
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results o f four different specifications of the model discussed 
in Chapter 4. Since the signs and magnitude of the coefficients are consistent across 
specification. F-test were conducted on the different regressions helping to conclude that 
the MODEL ( I ) was the better one to use. Therefore, the focus will be on this first 
regression. The results fi'om this regression are consistent with the predictions o f the 
dollarization theory.’ Nevertheless, since the regression includes one and two lagged 
terms of the dependent variable as independent variables, the effect of changes in the 
independent variables on MRR will persist longer than the period in which they occur.
The variable VALUE represents changes of the real exchange rate firom its long­
term trend. An increase in this variable means the peso is temporarily undervalued. 
VALUE-1 has a negative sign and it is statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition. 
VALUE-2 has positive sign and it is statistically significant at the 1% level
’Unit root tests were performed on the data series. The null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity could not be rejected at the 5% level of significance. However, since the 
sample size is relatively small and the regression used in this study is similar to the 
standard regression used in the literature, this regression was not modified to deal with 
nonstationarity.
21
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Table 3 Empirical Results
10
v a r ia b l e MODEL (1)
( Standard Error'®)
MODEL (2) 
(Standard Error)
MODEL (3) 
(Standard Error)
MODEL (4) 
(Standard Error)
CONSTANT 0.011614
(0.005063)-»*
0.013637 
( 0.005623)**
0.014514
(0.006221)**
0.004706
(0.006402)
TREND 0.000953
(0.000285)***
0.000903
(0.000295)***
0.000433
(0.000291)
0.000642
(0.000296)**
VALUE 0.005731
(0.003278)*
VALUE-i -0.006046
(0.003331)*
-0.005961
(0.003483)*
-0.001433
(0.003584)
-0.012906
(0.004618)***
VALUE-: 0.015426
(0.004140)***
0.015657
(0.004346)***
0.008914
(0.004319)**
0.012143
(0.004338)***
INFR 0.000235
(0.000111)**
[NFR-i -0.000423
(0.000119)***
-0.000426
(0.0000121)***
-0.000221
(0.000118)*
-0.000574
(0.000158)***
[NFR-2 0.000503
(0.000163)***
0.000457
(0.00176)**
0.000190
(0.000175)
0.000422
(0.000174)»*
INFR-3 -0.000241
(0.0000887)***
-0.000145
(0.000163)
-0.00000727
(0.000175)
-0.0000936
(0.000156)
[NFR-J -0.0000665
(0.0000914)
-0.000115
(0.000100)
-0.0000503
(0.0000870)
PRES 0.005781
(0.002215)*
0.006310
(0.002330)***
0.007494
(0.002553)***
0.004561
(0.002303)*
MRR-i 1.207205
(0.135834)***
1.178948
(0.141455)***
0.767946
(0.088052)***
1.178864
(0.134196)***
MRR-2 -0.602668
(0.154275)***
-0.568272
(0.161774)***
-0.428905
(0.161581)**
“Level of significance: ***= 1 %;**=5%;*= 10%.
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Table 3. Continuation.
MODEL (1) MODEL (2) MODEL (3) MODEL (4)
R-squared= 0.9837 0.9831 0.9788 0.9854
Adj. R-squared= 0.9809 0.9796 0.9750 0.9817
D-W= 2.0719 1.9825 1.3708 1.9755
Durbin-h= 0.0282*** 0.0683*** 155* 104*
SEE= 0.002885 0.002841 0.003713 0.002449
F-stat.= 343.8579*** 285.4252*** 2816008*** 265.2624***
Breusch-Godfrey= 4.9898** 5.0436** 12325*
Observations= 60 61 60 60
The explanation behind the negative coefficient of VALLTE-i is that if the peso is 
undervaluated temporarily in the previous quarter, MRR will decrease by 6.046% in the 
present quarter, holding everything else constant. However, it is more difficult to attach a 
sensible interpretation to the coefficient of VALUE-z, because of the inclusion of MRR 
lagged one and two periods as independent variables. Therefore, to gauge the impact of 
VALUE on MRR, consider Figure 4.
TEMPORARY 4 QUARTER INCREASE IN VALUE
UJ 4  _Oz
<r
0  2 -
a:cr
MRR
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
QUARTERS
Figure 4. Effect of a Four Quarter Temporary Increase in the Deviation of the Real 
Exchange Rate from Trend on the Dollarization Ratio.
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Figure 4 presents the effects of a four quarter one peso per dollar increase in 
deviation of the real exchange rate from its long-term trend (VALUE) on MRR. ‘ ‘ The 
vertical axis represents the impact on MRR and the horizontal axis represents the quarters 
over which the effect spreads. The VALUE variable has a negative effect on MRR in the 
first quarter of the increase, hut the effect is positive after that for several quarters. In 
fact, it takes over twelve quarters for the effect on MRR to decrease to zero. The theory 
behind the negative effect on MRR in the first quarter is that when the peso devaluates 
temporarily, it becomes more attractive to money holders which leads to a decrease in 
MRR. Furthermore, the intuition that supports the positive effect on MRR, after the first 
quarter of the temporary devaluation, is explained by the money holders’ reaction to 
uncertainty regarding how long the peso is going to be undervaluated. Therefore, if the 
deviation from trend lasts longer than a quarter, money holders become more cautious 
about holding pesos. The peso becomes less attractive than before and this leads to an 
increase in MRR. which last for several more quarters.
The inflation differential between Mexico and the U.S., as a proxy for expected 
peso depreciation (INFR), has a negative total effect on MRR. An increase in this variable 
means that the peso is expected to depreciate in relation to the dollar. The coefficient of 
INFR-1 is negative and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the 
coefficient of INFR-2 is positive and it is also statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
interpretation of the coefficient of INFR t, is that if the inflat io n  differential increases by
“This graph is constructed from the estimated coefficients on VALUE-i, 
VALUE-2, MRR I ,  and MRR 2,  similar to an impulse response fimction in time series 
analysis.
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1%, MRR would decrease by 0.423%, holding everything else constant. The intuition is 
that as the inflation differential increases, money holders become suspicious about the 
government’s reaction towards the inflation increase. Therefore, as a precaution, afi-aid 
that the government might exchange their dollar-denominated deposits for pesos at a rate 
below market as it previously did in 1982, money holders reduce their dollar-denominated 
deposits. This action leads to a decrease in MRR. Because of the form in which the 
regression is constructed, it is more difficult to assign a specific interpretation to the 
coefficient of INFR-2. Therefore, it is necessary to look at Figure 5 and Figure 6 to 
measure the total long-term impact of INFR on MRR. “ The effect o f a 40% four quarter 
temporary increase in the inflation differential between Mexico and the U.S. is presented in 
Figure 5.
TEMPORARY 4 QUARTER INCREASE IN INFR (40%)
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Figure 5. Effect of a Four Quarter Forty Percent Temporary Increase in the Inflation 
Differential on the Dollarization Ratio.
'‘A 40% increase is used because this number is close to the standard deviation of
INFR.
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According to Figure 5. the effect of a four quarter 40% increase in the inflation 
differential on MRR is spread over several quarters. The effect is negative over the first 
four quarters after the increase, but then it is positive to a smaller extent over the next four 
quarters. In sum. it takes over ten quarters for the effect on MRR to be reduced to zero. 
The theory behind the negative effect of the increase in INFR is that money holders reduce 
their dollar-denominated deposits as a precautionary reaction to the uncertainty regarding 
the government's policies towards the inflation increase, which leads to a decrease in 
MRR (though not necessarily a decrease in the dollar holdings outside the banks). 
Additionally, the theory behind the positive effect of the increase in the inflation 
differential on MRR after four quarters, is that after the increase in INFR has continued 
for a few quarters, the peso has depreciated, and if the government has not reacted with a 
de-dollarization policy, pesos become less attractive and money holders start to exchange 
back their peso holdings for dollars which leads to an increase in MRR. In similar manner, 
the effect of a 40% permanent increase in INFR is presented in Figure 6.
PERMANENT INCREASE IN INFR (40%)
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Figime 6. Effect of a Forty Percent Permanent Increase in the Inflation Differential on the 
Dollarization Ratio.
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The effect of a permanent increase of 40% in the inflation differential as shown in 
Figure 6. is a permanent decrease in MRR of about 1.5%. The results fi'om the increase in 
the inflation differential are not consistent with the dollarization theory. The dollarization 
ratio was expected to increase as the inflation differential increases. However, when the 
inflation in Mexico increases in relation to the inflation in the U.S.. dollar holdings 
decrease permanently due to a precautionary reaction by the money holders, which leads 
to a decrease in MRR. This does not mean that the tme dollarization ratio has declined.
As expected, the effect of a Presidential election (PRES) as a measure of “political 
risk”, on MRR is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level o f significance. In 
this case, it is also necessary to refer to Figure 7 to better judge the long-term impact of 
PRES on MRR.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN QUARTER FIVE
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
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Figure 7. Effect of a Presidential Election on the Dollarization Ratio.
Figure 7 shows that when a Presidential election has occurred or is going to occur, 
MRR increases starting four quarters before the election, and increases even more for four 
quarters after the election. The effect decreases for several quarters after, but it does not
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decrease to zero until more than twelve quarters after the election quarter. This positive 
effect on MRR is due to the uncertainty regarding governmental changes and the new 
political policies which can affect the domestic currency.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of inflation rates, exchange 
rates, and political instability on the process of dollarization with respect to the Mexican 
economy. The findings suggest that money demanders are sensitive to changes in 
inflation, risk of forced de-dollarization, the degree of over or undervaluation of the peso, 
and political changes. This phenomenon is common in Latin America.
Although, in theory Mexico ended the use of dollar denominated bank accounts to 
the public in August 1982, the use of dollar currency is still prevalent. As long as inflation 
rates continue to be higher relative to the inflation in the United States, and fears that the 
peso might lose its value exists in the money holders’ mind, along with poUtical instability, 
dollarization will continue to be an issue in Mexico, even though it cannot be measured 
with complete precision.
Reversing the dollarization process requires domestic currency to be a better 
alternative. Credible economic reforms that provide a manageable inflation rate and 
prevent continuous currency devaluations are needed along with programs that can help to 
increase the confidence in the political system These will help to reduce the dollarization 
process and also give the control of monetary policy back to the domestic government.
29
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The model of dollarization presented here is still exploratory and can be improved 
for future research. Future research should focus on understanding the microfoundations 
of currency substitution and expectation formation. Additionally, the nonstationarity of 
the available data should be explored further for even better results. Similarly, the lack of 
data on the amount of dollars circulating in the Mexican economy is in itself a great 
obstacle to measure with accuracy the effects that the variables already mentioned have on 
the true dollarization ratio.
Dollarization is a rational response by economic agents to continuous instability in 
the value of the domestic currency. Hence, central bank policies aimed at restricting or 
increasing the cost of dollarization may delay the process, but are unlikely to end it.
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